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The practice of permitting legislators to earn outside income, income apart
from compensation for service in office, is a frequent battlefield in the fight
against legislative corruption in the United States. Critics of the practice
argue that such income creates potential conflicts of interest, pitting
legislators’ personal pecuniary interests against the public interest. As public
servants, legislators should not be accountable to other paymasters and
should not use their legislative positions to enrich themselves beyond their
official salary. On the other hand, legislators point out that their positions
are generally low-paid and part-time, and that they have the right—perhaps
even the need—to supplement their salaries. State legislatures have always
included doctors and farmers and teachers and entrepreneurs; those
legislators arguably should not have to give up their livelihoods to serve the
public.
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In practice, many legislative corruption scandals have involved legislators receiving hefty sums from jobs outside of
the legislature—often in exchange for little actual work—in apparent attempts to influence their votes. For example,
New York Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver was convicted in 2015 on federal corruption charges for accepting
millions of dollars in referral fees from two law firms in exchange for using his legislative office to benefit the firm
and their clients by influencing certain legislation, steering public finds to affiliated entities, and other official acts.
New York Assemblyman William Boyland, Jr. was convicted in 2014 for setting up a real-estate deal in exchange for
$250,000 in fees related to a fake consulting job. Such lawmakers earned outside income by abusing their authority,
not by engaging in honest work.
However, not all controversies concerning outside income are as clear-cut. Consider, for example: a California state
senator who is an optometrist and authored bills that would allow medical practitioners (including himself) to
provide a broader range of medical services; a Texas state legislator who ran a payday lending business and fought
against a bill designed to help consumers entrapped by high-interest loans; or a legislator in New Mexico who runs a
small oil and gas company and opposed new fees and regulations for his industry. However, those conflicts were
out in the open, unlike in the criminal cases of Silver and Boyland, so that voters and legislative colleagues could
consider them when evaluating a given legislator’s position. To ensure that—at a minimum—legislative conflicts of
interest are not hidden, state should adopt appropriate ethics rules and oversight mechanisms.
A Regulatory Toolbox
There are three basic tools available to legislatures to address ethical concerns about outside income. The most basic
is financial disclosure. Disclosure requirements make legislators’ financial interests accessible, so that watchdogs—
and voters—can more easily identify apparent conflicts of interest and hold the legislators accountable for them.
Disclosure requirements work best in tandem with other rules and regulations governing conflicts of interest, to set
standards of official conduct and penalize noncompliance. However, both of those approaches are vulnerable to
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abuse by unscrupulous legislators. When practical, it may be better to establish a bright-line rule, such as a cap on
the amount of outside income that legislators are allowed to earn.
The best set of rules depends on the particular circumstances of a given state. Relatively strict or intrusive
approaches may be more appropriate for states with relatively “full-time” legislatures in contrast to states with truly
“part-time” legislatures. This distinction depends upon factors such as a legislator’s salary and allotment for staff
and other resources, the size of a legislature and the frequency of its meetings, and the amount of time legislators
typically devote to legislative duties including official travel. The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL)
has divided the state legislatures into five categories, ranging from “full-time” (e.g. California and New York) to
“hybrid” (e.g. Oregon and Texas) to “part-time” (e.g. New Hampshire and Utah).
The United States Congress, clearly a full-time legislature (despite its enviably long breaks), might serve as a
pacesetter for disclosure, conflict of interest rules, and an income cap. Members of Congress must disclose all
income sources including the source, type, and amount or value of the income, as well as legal expense funds,
official or sponsored travel, official mail usage, and other items. All such disclosures are publicly available via the
House Clerk. The ethics committees of the House and Senate also maintain broad conflict-of-interest policies and
provide related advice to members.1 And the United States Congress caps outside income at 15% of the annual
salary of a top-level executive official (roughly $175,000). Moreover, legislators may not earn any income from, be
employed by, or be publicly associated with, any business providing professional services that involve a fiduciary
relationship (such as law, finance, or insurance).
Those limitations on outside income have not stamped out corruption in Congress. Critics charge that the rules are
still too weak or too vague and there are valid concerns about a revolving door enabling former legislators to work
as lobbyists targeting their former colleagues. Nevertheless, Congress’s rules governing disclosure, conflicts of
interest, and a cap on outside income have limited opportunities for legislators to wrongfully enrich themselves in
public service. States looking to curb legislative corruption should follow suit.
Financial Disclosure
Financial disclosure informs the public of legislators’ financial interests and potential conflicts. According to the
NCSL, 47 states currently require legislators to file some type of financial disclosure, although their requirements
vary widely. Colorado, for example, requires disclosure of all sources of income, regardless of the amount.
Connecticut and Iowa, in contrast, require disclosure only of income sources that exceed $1000 in a given year. A
few states, including Florida and Illinois, have constitutional provisions that require lawmakers to make annual
disclosures of financial interests. Many states also require other areas of disclosure including gifts, clients, and
interests in businesses and real estate.
States also vary in whether legislators must make disclosures covering their spouses, dependent children, and other
family members. Generally, those disclosures are less intrusive than those for legislators themselves, due to privacy
concerns. For example, Massachusetts requires legislators to disclosure income sources for family members, but not
actual amounts earned.
Disclosure reveals information critical for investigations by oversight agencies and other government watchdogs, to
hold legislators accountable for violations. Furthermore, financial transparency may encourage legislators to comply
with ethics rules and avoid conflicts of interest to receive a favorable impression from voters and civil society
Among other provisions, the Senate bans the earning of income “inconsistent or in conflict with the conscientious performance of
official duties.” The House Ethics manual defines “conflict of interest” as a situation in which a member’s “conduct of his office conflicts
with his private economic affairs.” In unclear cases, legislators are instructed to consult with their respective ethics committee.
1
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groups. For example, Common Cause New York publishes an annual review of outside income earned by state
legislators.
However, disclosure alone is an insufficient safeguard against legislative corruption. Unscrupulous legislators can
avoid detection by exploiting loopholes and disguising assets and income through complex financial arrangements.
A decline in statehouse press coverage has reduced scrutiny of legislators’ filings. Finally, incumbent protection
measures like gerrymandering and uncontested primaries as well as broader national trends such as partisan
polarization and the nationalization of local politics have limited voters’ ability to vote out corrupt legislators.
Regulating Conflicts of Interest
Beyond mere disclosure, many states regulate legislators’ earning of outside income through laws and ethics rules
governing when such income constitutes an improper conflict of interest, and how that conflict should be resolved.
Some states define such conflicts of interest narrowly. Some definitions apply only to legislation that directly affects a
legislator’s personal financial interests. For example, North Dakota requires legislators (and judicial officers) to
disclose when they have a “direct and substantial personal or pecuniary interest in a matter before that … body.” In
such cases, a legislator can only vote with legislative consent.
In contrast, New Hampshire is an example of a state that defines conflict of interest more broadly, as “the
condition in which a legislator has a financial interest in any official activity.” This definition is broad in two ways.
First, it encompasses any official activity and not merely voting. Second, it lacks a requirement of a “direct” impact
on a legislator’s financial interest. However, in New Hampshire, a conflict of interest triggers few ramifications;
conflicted legislators must merely disclose the conflict and file a “declaration of intent” to resolve it.
Other states fall somewhere in between. Many states, like New York and Florida, prohibit legislators from interests
that are in “substantial conflict” with the proper discharge of … duties in the public interest.” Alabama defines
conflicts as any decision or duty that would “materially affect” the financial interests of a legislator or his or her
family members. Connecticut foresees a conflict if legislators have “reason to believe” they or their family members
would derive a direct monetary gain or suffer a direct monetary loss. Connecticut and Nebraska, among other states,
carve out an exception for measures that merely affect a legislator’s broader interests—such as legislation affecting a
class or occupation to which the legislator belongs.
States vary not only in their definition of conflict of interest, but also in terms of the consequences of such a
conflict. Some states merely require disclosure, others require recusal. In some states a conflicted legislator need
only officially swear to act impartially, while in others the legislature must vote to allow an exemption. Five states
have constitutional provisions requiring lawmakers to
disclose any conflicts of interest before voting on related
matters: Alabama, Delaware, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and
The application of the rules may be just as
Texas.

important as the rules themselves.

It’s difficult for states to set conflict-of-interest rules
that are strict enough to deter ethical misconduct,
flexible enough to encompass a range of scenarios, and yet clear enough to guide legislators. In most states,
legislatures set their own ethics rules and police members’ violations, compounding the impression that conflict-ofinterest rules that look tough on paper may be flimsy in practice. Thus, the application of the rules may be just as
important as the rules themselves. Lawmakers should have clear guidance to avoid conflicts, options to minimize
conflicts that arise, and confidence that rules will be enforced fairly and predictably. Each state should have a
powerful, independent ethics body responsible for training and enforcement. (For more on state watchdog
institutions, see CAPI’s state-by-state oversight survey.)
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Income Cap
Perhaps the clearest and strictest approach to outside income is an upper limit, or cap, on the amount of outside
income a legislator can earn. A cap avoids many of the difficulties of defining and regulating conflicts of interest and
affords legislators some degree of freedom to pursue personal and professional interests, such as a part-time
medical practice or the upkeep of a small family farm. A cap would allow legislators with specialized professional
knowledge to participate in relevant legislative debates while limiting their ability to profit from their outside
employment. Of course, income caps are strongest in tandem with rules governing disclosure and conflicts of
interest.
The specific requirements of a cap must strike a reasonable balance. A cap that is too permissive would be
ineffective, but a cap that is too restrictive may impose financial hardship, deter legislators who are not
independently wealthy, and raise the temptation of taking bribes.
Although no state currently maintains an income cap, income caps would be most feasible in legislatures in which
lawmakers work a full-time schedule and are compensated accordingly. Unfortunately, polls show that voters often
support full-time legislatures with income caps but oppose legislative pay raises. Legislators in 42 states are paid
salaries lower than the national median household income of roughly $56,000, although many also receive generous
reimbursements for official travel and other expenses.
Conclusion
The income that legislators earn outside of their official salaries potentially creates conflicts of interest. Each state
must determine the right mix of measures to minimize conflicts of interest, mindful of lawmakers’ need for outside
income, particularly considering the part-time nature of most state legislatures. Relatively full-time legislatures in
states like California, New York, and Pennsylvania should consider following Congress’s model and adopting robust
disclosure requirements, fulsome regulations governing conflicts of interest, and an income cap. Indeed, most state
legislatures govern states that are comparable to significant nations in size, population, and wealth—hardly part-time
work.
However, restrictions on outside income are only as effective as their enforcement. It is not enough to regulate
outside income on paper; powerful, independent watchdogs are needed to oversee disclosures and enforce conflictof-interest rules and to provide reliable advice to lawmakers. In a gray area like outside income, bright lines and
clear guidance are essential.
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